Abstract-This paper proposes a new continuous-time first best contract framework that has the ability to explicitly limit the agent's risks. This limitation of risk is achieved by formulating the contract design problem as a mean-variance constrained stochastic optimal control problem. To obtain a globally optimal contract even when system dynamics are nonlinear, we develop a dynamic programming-based solution approach. The major theoretical challenge arises from the variance inequality constraint. To overcome this difficulty, we track and limit the agent's risk using a new stochastic system, whose state value can be interpreted as the agent's remaining budget for risks. We also propose an approximately decoupled contract design approach for multiple agents to resolve the scalability issue inherent in dynamic programming. The procedures in this contract design for multiple agents can be completely parallelized. We show that this approximate contract satisfies each agent's individual rationality condition and has a provable suboptimality bound. The performance and usefulness of the proposed contract method and its application to demand response are demonstrated using data on the electric energy consumption of customers in Austin, Texas, and the locational marginal price data from the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas.
the principal. For example, an electricity utility (as the principal) wants to efficiently manage its revenue, while its customer (as the agent) may want to reduce his energy bill and use electricity in a way that guarantees his comfort. In such situations with conflicted interests, the principal may want to compensate the agent for being cooperative by making an appropriate contract. A typical example is contracting between an investor (as the principal) and a portfolio manager (as the agent).
Depending on the information available to the principal, we can classify the principal-agent problem into the following three types: (i) the first best case, or risk sharing, in which both parties have the same information; (ii) the second best case, or moral hazard, in which the principal has no ability to observe the agent's action; and (iii) the third best case, or adverse selection, in which the principal does not know the agent's type or action. This paper focuses on the continuous-time first best contract, i.e., optimal contracting between the principal and the agent under symmetric information.
In the first best case, the principal offers a contract to the agent, which consists of a compensation rule and a control strategy that the agent must follow. The agent can accept or reject the contract. Specifically, the agent would accept the contract only if his expected utility exceeds a certain threshold. This condition is often called the agent's individual rationality. While guaranteeing the agent's individual rationality condition, the principal's interest is to maximize her utility throughout this contract. The first best contract can be interpreted as an agreement on how to share the risks, generated by stochastic system dynamics, between the two parties-this is why it is called a risk sharing problem. The portion of risks transferred to the agent has been implicitly handled by the relative risk aversion between the principal and the agent, which are embedded in their utility functions (e.g., [1] ). This approach using the expected utility theory often provides an elegant form of an optimal contract under certain assumptions and is useful for answering economics questions [1] [2] [3] [4] . However, these methods are unable to explicitly limit the agent's risks, which is often of interest in engineering applications. Furthermore, in practice, it is difficult to accurately estimate the agent's utility. An unexpectedly large portion of risks can be transferred to the agent if an inaccurate utility function is used in designing the contract. This would lead the agent to refuse to enter into the contract again in practical applications.
In this paper, we propose a constrained risk sharing model to answer the following question: How can we explicitly limit the risks that are transferred to the agent in the first best contract? This new first best contract model splits the conventional agent's individual rationality condition, which is an inequality constraint on the agent's expected utility, into (i) an inequality constraint on the mean of the agent's wealth, and (ii) an inequality constraint on the variance of the agent's wealth. In other words, the agent would accept the contract only if (i) his expected wealth exceeds a certain threshold, and (ii) the variance of his wealth is limited by another threshold. Interpreting the variance of the agent's wealth as the agent's risk, this new model has the ability to limit risk due to the latter variance inequality constraint. Another advantage of the proposed model is that it does not require the agent's utility function. Therefore, it is useful when the agent's utility function is difficult to estimate.
The principal's problem is to identify a pair of optimal compensation and control strategies for the agent satisfying the aforementioned mean-variance constraints. Mathematically, the problem of optimal constrained risk sharing is a mean-variance constrained stochastic optimal control problem. The major theoretical challenge arises from the variance inequality constraint. One may be able to use the stochastic maximum principle to solve this contract design problem [4] [5] [6] . However, it gives a locally optimal solution unless the problem is concave. Furthermore, this approach requires us to solve an associated forwardbackward stochastic differential equation, which is a nontrivial task [7] [8] [9] . Another potential approach is to use the martingale method, which is popular in dynamic portfolio optimization [10] , [11] and is also used in risk sharing [3] . This approach decomposes a stochastic control problem into two subproblems: (i) computing the optimal value of the objective function by considering its dual problem, and (ii) finding an admissible control strategy that achieves this optimal value. In many portfolio optimization problems, this approach has a computational advantage because the convex analysis for the optimality condition in the first subproblem is straightforward under reasonable assumptions, and the optimal control strategy in the second subproblem often has an analytic expression when system dynamics are simple enough (e.g., geometric Brownian motion). However, both steps are nontrivial in the proposed contract design problem due to the variance inequality and possibly nonlinear dynamical system constraints.
A more classical approach to stochastic optimal control is dynamic programming [12] [13] [14] . However, the variance inequality constraint prevents us from directly using this approach. To overcome this limitation, we propose to reformulate the problem so that it can be solved by dynamic programming. The key idea is to track and limit the agent's risk using a new stochastic system whose state at time t represents the agent's expected budget for risks over [t, T ]. Therefore, we can replace the variance inequality constraint as the non-negativity constraint on the terminal value of this system state. We show that the proposed reformulation approach is exact. It turns out that the reformulated problem involves stochastic control with a stochastic target constraint over a lifted state-space [15] , [16] . A globally optimal contract can be obtained as a dynamic programming solution to this problem: we numerically solve an associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to evaluate the value function of the problem, and then use the value function information to construct an optimal contract that is comprised of an optimal compensation rule and an optimal control strategy for the agent. The proposed solution method can handle more general system dynamics (e.g., nonlinear systems) than existing optimal risksharing approaches based on the stochastic maximum principle or the martingale method.
One drawback of dynamic programming is its scalability. Since in dynamic programming computational complexity increases exponentially with system dimension, the proposed method does not provide a computationally tractable approach to constructing optimal contracts for a large number of agents, each of which controls his local system. To resolve this scalability issue, we propose an approximately decoupled contract design approach for multiple agents: the problem for N agents can be decomposed into N low-dimensional contract design problems, each for a single agent. Due to the decomposition, the computational complexity of the proposed dynamic programming-based method increases linearly with the number of agents. Furthermore, the decoupled contract design problem for an agent is independent of that for another agent. Therefore, this contract design procedure for multiple agents can be completely parallelized. We show that this approximate contract satisfies each agent's individual rationality condition and has a provable suboptimality bound that can be computed in a decentralized way.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the definition of the variance-constrained risk-sharing model. In Section III, we propose an exact reformulation approach for the optimal contract design problem and develop a dynamic programming-based solution method. The mathematical details for the proposed reformulation approach and the proof of its exactness are presented in Section IV. We also provide an approximately decoupled contract design approach for multiple agents. In Section V, we apply the proposed contract method to financial risk management for a load-serving entity and its customers using direct load control. The performance of the contact is demonstrated with data on the electric energy consumption of customers in Austin, Texas, and the locational marginal price data from the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas.
II. VARIANCE-CONSTRAINED RISK SHARING

A. Stochastic Dynamics With Symmetric Information
Consider the n-dimensional state process x := {x(t)} 0≤t≤T driven by the following controlled stochastic differential equation:
where u := {u(t)} 0≤t≤T is an m-dimensional control process determined by the agent and B := {B(t)} 0≤t≤T is an l-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on the complete probability space (Ω, F, P). The diffusion coefficient or volatility σ : R n → R n ×l with l ≤ n is a given continuous function such that rank(σ(x)) = l for any x ∈ R n . 1 We also assume that each entry of σ(·) is bounded. Suppose that
m . In addition, we assume that there exists a constant K such that for all
where · denotes a standard 2-norm. Then, there exists a unique solution in L 2 (0, T ), where L 2 (0, T ) denotes the space of all real-valued, progressively measurable stochastic processes
2 dt] < ∞ (e.g., [17] ). The set of admissible control strategies is chosen as U := {u : [0, T ] → U | u(t) progressively measurable with respect to F B (t)}, where U is a compact set in R m and {F B (t)} 0≤t≤T is the filtration (history) of the Brownian motion B. Note that constraints on admissible control value can be embedded in the compact set U. For simplicity, we suppress the dependency of variables on time t throughout the paper.
The principal and agent's wealth functions (e.g., in dollars) are given by
respectively, where r p and r a represent the principal's and agent's running wealth functions and C represents the principal's payment to the agent at the end of the contract period, i.e., at time T . The set of admissible compensation schemes is chosen as C := {C ∈ R | C is F B (T )-measurable}. In other words, the payment C can be chosen based on all the information in [0, T ]. We assume that r p is continuous and has quadratic growth, and r a is globally Lipschitz continuous. These growth and continuity conditions on r p and r a are needed for the dynamic programming principle with state constraints which will guarantee an associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to have a unique viscosity solution [18] .
The following assumption applies to the entire paper: Assumption 1: The principal and the agent have exactly the same information: both parties know the agent's control strategy u and monitor the state process x. In addition, they have information about (i) the system dynamics, and (ii) the wealth functions.
Under this symmetric information, the principal offers the agent a contract, which consists of (i) the compensation C paid to the agent; and (ii) the control strategy u that the agent must follow. As we will see later, optimal C and u are state feedback strategies. These two components must be designed by the principal before the contract starts, i.e., before time 0. If the agent accepts the contract at time 0, the optimal control is executed by the agent over the contract period [0, T ]. The agent receives the compensation payment from the principal at time T , which is calculated using the pre-specified optimal compensation rule and the information in [0, T ]. The timeline of continuous-time contracting is summarized in Fig. 1 .
This principal-agent problem with information symmetry is said to be first best or risk sharing [3] , [4] . In this paper, we focus on the first best contract, which is more beneficial to the principal than second best (moral hazard) or third best (adverse selection) contracts in which the principal has less information than the agent. However, the proposed contract is different from classical first best contracts in the sense that the proposed contract limits the risk transferred to the agent by a certain threshold.
B. Risk Sharing
Before introducing the proposed contract, we first record the classical risk-sharing or first-best contracting problem. Given the principal's and the agent's utility functions, U p and U a , which are known to both parties, an optimal risk-sharing problem can be formulated as
The last inequality constraint (3c) is often called the agent's individual rationality condition. It implies that a rational agent would accept the contract (C, u) only if the agent's expected utility exceeds the threshold U. This threshold is often chosen as maximum expected utility that the agent can achieve when the agent commits to alternative options. In this classical framework, the agent's risk aversion is modeled with a concave increasing utility function such as exponential utility. This expected utility hypothesis plays an important role in economics and decision theory, and several utility-based measures of risk aversion have been proposed (e.g., [19] [20] [21] ). However, this classical risk-sharing model is unable to explicitly limit the agent's risk, which is often of interest. 
C. Variance-Constrained Risk Sharing
We propose a new first best continuous-time contract model that can explicitly limit the agent's risks
In this new model, the individual rationality condition splits into the following two inequality conditions: (i) the mean value of the agent's wealth should exceed w, and (ii) the variance of the agent's wealth must be limited by r. We call the latter the agent's risk-limiting condition. 3 Similar to the classical model, w and r can be chosen as the maximum expected value and minimum variance of the agent's wealth that can be earned when the agent commits to alternative options. This model has an advantage over the standard risk sharing model when the agent's risk should be explicitly limited or the agent's utility function is difficult to estimate. This risk-limiting capability of the proposed model is particularly useful in electricity demand response programs as explained and demonstrated in Section V. Risk is an emerging important metric in such applications due to price volatility and uncertainty generated from renewable energy sources. In addition, our model can separately manage the mean and variance of the agent's wealth unlike the classical model.
In this paper, we choose the following utility function for the principal:
where θ ∈ R \ {0} is a coefficient that represents the principal's risk aversion. When θ is positive, the utility function penalizes the risk of the principal's wealth being small because − exp(−θJ p ) is concave and increasing in J p . Therefore, the principal can make a risk-averse decision by solving (4) . Note that maximizing the expected value of the utility function is equivalent to maximizing the following risk-sensitive objective function:
The risk-sensitive objective function can be approximated by a weighted sum of the mean and the variance of the wealth when |θ| is small, because its Taylor expansion is given by
as θ → 0. The variance of the payoff is penalized when θ > 0. The contract design problem (4) with the utility function (5) is a mean-variance constrained risk-sensitive control problem. The major theoretical challenge arises due to the variance inequality constraint (4d). As summarized in the Introduction, approaches using the stochastic maximum principle or the martingale method yield a globally optimal solution under restrictive assumptions on system dynamics. These restrictions may exclude some important engineering problems, including electric load control for power systems, due to possibly nonlinear system dynamics. To overcome this limitation, we propose a dynamic programming-based solution approach. Since the variance inequality constraint hinders us from directly using dynamic programming, we reformulate this problem over a lifted state-space. The key idea of the proposed reformulation is to introduce a one-dimensional auxiliary dynamical system that tracks the agent's risk. The terminal state of this system, which represents the agent's remaining budget for risks, is used to reformulate the constraint on the variance of the agent's wealth.
III. OPTIMAL CONTRACTS
A. Exact Reformulation
In this section, we introduce a reformulated contract design problem equivalent to the original problem (4) and provide highlevel explanations for it. Proof of the exactness of the reformulation is postponed to Section IV-B.
The proposed reformulated problem is as follows:
where
The new state variable v(t) represents the agent's expected wealth over [t, T ], conditioned on the information up to t. Due to the constraints (6c), (6d), and (6e), the proposed compensation scheme can be written as
We will see in Section IV that the existence and uniqueness of the auxiliary control variable α is guaranteed by the martingale representation theorem. Under this compensation, the agent's wealth is given by
Therefore, this compensation scheme guarantees the first part of the individual rationality condition. Furthermore, due to the Itô's isometry, we have
Because of this relationship, we can interpret α as the control variable that manages the agent's risk. To satisfy the risklimiting condition, which is the second part of the individual rationality, the following expected budget constraint must hold:
We can easily check that the constraints (6f), (6g), and (6h) guarantee this inequality to hold. Intuitively speaking, another new state y(t) represents the agent's expected budget for risks over [t, T ] conditioned on the information up to t: the constraint (6f) describes the dynamic evolution of its value, and the constraint (6g) specifies the total budget for the agent's risks. Finally, the agent's budget for risks should not be overspent, and therefore y(T ) must be non-negative as specified in the constraint (6h). This intuition will be mathematically formalized in Section IV. So far we have checked that the contract (C, u) obtained by solving the reformulated problem satisfies the agent's individual rationality condition in terms of both the mean and the variance of the agent's wealth. In fact, we can show a stronger result demonstrating that this contract is also optimal to the principal.
Theorem 1: Let (u * , α * , β * ) be a solution to (6) and (x * , v * , y * ) be the corresponding processes that satisfy the constraints. Choose the compensation scheme as
Then, (C * , u * ) solves (4), i.e., it is an optimal contract. A proof of this theorem is postponed until mathematical formalisms of the two new state variables v and y are provided in Section IV. Throughout this paper, we assume that there exists an optimal contract, i.e., a solution to (4) . When an optimal contract does not exist, we can construct an -suboptimal contract as an -suboptimal solution of the reformulated problem (6) . A detailed discussion on constructing an -suboptimal solution of an optimal control problem can be found in [24] .
It is important to note that the reformulated problem can now be solved by dynamic programming. We discuss the HamiltonJacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which admits the value function (or value-to-go) of the reformulated problem as its viscosity solution in the following subsection. This HJB equation is practically important because convergent numerical methods are available to approximate its viscosity solution (e.g., [25] , [26] ), and we can synthesize an optimal contract strategy from the solution that corresponds to the value function of the contract design problem.
B. Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equations With Reduced Dimension
Our goal in this subsection is to compute the following principal's value function for the contract design problem:
and the set of admissible controls is given by
The reformulated contract design problem is still nontrivial due to the constraint y(T ) ≥ 0 a.s., which is often called the stochastic target constraint. To handle this constraint, we use the HJB characterization recently proposed in [16] . 5 This approach converts the target constraint into a "classical" state constraint using the geometric dynamic programming principle [15] 
Intuitively speaking, the set D represents the set of states (indexed with t) that are almost surely reachable to the target y(T ) ≥ 0. Our hope is to find an optimal control strategy that does not cross the boundary of D. This reformulated constraint is embedded in the following auxiliary value function:
Using this auxiliary value function, the value function (9) can be rewritten as
Note that we have
in the reformulated contract design problem, because (i) we can set α(s) = β(s) = 0 for all s ∈ [t, T ] once the system hits the boundary at t, i.e., y(t) = 0; and (ii) if y(t) < 0, there exists nonzero probability that y(T ) ≤ 0, no matter how we choose the control, due to the nonpositive drift term in the dynamics (6f) of y. Applying the dynamic programming principle and the noncrossing condition for the boundary of D proposed in [16] , we can show that the value function is the viscosity solution of the following constrained-HJB equation [28] , [27] , [16] , [18] :
and the noncrossing condition for the boundary of D is encoded in the following set:
Note that the HJB equation is the result of dynamic programming when the constraint y ≤ 0 in Q(y) is inactive [27] . On the other hand, when it is active, the HJB equation updates the value function freezing α and β as zero so as not to cross the boundary of D and therefore to satisfy the stochastic target constraint. Refer to [16] for more mathematical details. The uniqueness of the viscosity solution can be shown by weak dynamic programming for state constraints [18] . We observe that the value function can be obtained by solving a lower dimensional HJB equation. The dimension is reduced by one in the case of one agent. 6 Theorem 2: Let φ = φ(x, y, t) be the viscosity solution of the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
Then, the value function defined as (9) can be computed as
Proof: We can show that (11) is the dynamic programming equation of an (equivalent) stochastic target constrained problem by plugging the constraints (6c), (6d) and (6e) related with v into the objective function (6a). Using [16] , [18] , we can show that φ has a unique viscosity solution. Let ψ(x, v, y, t) := φ(x, y, t) − v and plug this into the HJB equation (10) . Then, we can check that it solves the equation using D v ψ ≡ −1. Due to the uniqueness of ψ, we conclude that ψ can be computed as (12) .
This theorem implies that the principal's optimal value is linearly decreasing in the agent's guaranteed payoff w regardless of the risk aversion coefficient θ and initial values x(0) and y(0) because
It is worth mentioning that this is due to the linearity of the optimal compensation scheme (7) in w and the risk-sensitive objective function. If a different utility function for the principal were used, this property and the proposed dimension reduction may not be valid.
C. Optimal Contract as a State Feedback Strategy
In general, an analytic solution of the HJB equation (11) is not available. Therefore, we grid up the state space, which corresponds to the domain of the partial differential equation, and numerically evaluate the solution at the grid points offline using convergent schemes, e.g., [25] , [26] . After solving the HJB equation, we can use the value function to construct an optimal contract (C * , u * ) as the following state feedback strategy:
as an element of the arg max in the HJB equation (11) at
e., the agent performs u * (t)); 4) Repeat 2) and 3) until t = T . 5) The agent is paid by C * = v * (T ). Note that in this rule, the value function φ (or ψ) and the initial values (x, w, r) must be specified in the contract. We can also compute the arg max in the HJB equation (11) in Step 2) offline at each grid point. The agent must follow u * in the proposed contract under symmetric information. The auxiliary control variables α * and β * are used to satisfy the agent's individual rationality condition, including the risk-limiting condition. We investigate the role of these auxiliary control variables and the optimality of the proposed contract in the following section. A more detailed discussion regarding how to synthesize an optimal control using the viscosity solution of an associated HJB equation, even when the viscosity solution is not differentiable, can be found in [24] . Since solving an HJB over a high-dimensional domain is impractical, we introduce an approximately decoupled contract with a performance guarantee in Section IV-B to handle the case of a large number of agents.
Given this contract, the mean and variance constraints can be audited since the contract is a state-feedback strategy and the state is observable to the principal. This verifiability is indeed a key feature of first-best contracting [4] . To calculate the mean and variance in practice, one can employ a Monte-Carlo method or track v and y values given the contract and the problem data.
IV. DYNAMICAL SYSTEM APPROACH TO TRACK AND LIMIT THE AGENT'S RISK
In this section, we show the optimality of the proposed contract, i.e., the exactness of the reformulated contract design problem (6), in a constructive way. The three key steps are (i) to interpret the agent's risk-limiting condition as an expected budget constraint, (ii) to derive a dynamical system that describes the evolution of the budget, and (iii) to impose an appropriate constraint to limit the agent's risk. We will see that it is natural to introduce the two states v and y in (6) for steps (i) and (ii), respectively.
A. Agent's Risk as a Budget
We begin by reformulating the risk-limiting condition as an expected budget constraint on the auxiliary control variable α, which manages the agent's risk in the sense that
In other words, α controls the volatility of the agent's wealth. 
and
and v is driven by (6c) with α. Proof: Suppose that there exists α ∈ A such that (13) and (14) hold with v(0) = E[J a [C, u] ]. Then, we have
Due to the Itô's isometry, the variance of the agent's wealth can be written as
Combining this equality with the budget expected constraint (14), we obtain the risk-limiting condition. Suppose now that the risk-limiting condition holds. We introduce a new process
which is often called the agent's continuation wealth or value [29] . The value represents the agent's expected wealth over [t, T ] conditioned on the information up to t. We notice that the process
is martingale. Therefore, the martingale representation theorem (e.g., [30] ) suggests that there exists a process α ∈ A such that
because σ(·) has full row rank. Here, the boundedness of each entry of σ(·) guarantees that T 0 α 2 dt < ∞. 7 Therefore, the process v satisfies the SDE (6c). By the definition of v, we also note that
We can now check that the equality (15) holds and hence so does (16) . Therefore
where the inequality holds due to the risk-limiting condition.
This theorem allows us to convert the variance inequality constraint into (i) a constraint on the compensation scheme C = v(T ), and (ii) an expected budget constraint on α. The next step is to reformulate the expected budget constraint as a constraint on the terminal value of a dynamical system that describes the evolution of the budget.
Proposition 1: Given processes α ∈ A and x ∈ L 2 (0, T ), the following expected budget constraint holds:
if and only if there exist processes β ∈ A and y ∈ L 2 (0, T ) such that
where the process y is driven by
Proof: Suppose that the process y solves the SDE (18) and y(T ) ≥ 0 a.s. Then, we have
a.s., which implies the expected budget constraint (17) . Suppose now that the inequality constraint (17) holds. Define the processȳ := {ȳ(t)} 0≤t≤T as
Note that the following process is martingale: Therefore, the martingale representation theorem guarantees that there exists a process β ∈ A such that
since σ(·) has full row rank and all of its entries are bounded.
On the other hand, due to the inequality (17), we havē
Let y := {y(t)} 0≤t≤T be the process defined as
Then y solves the SDE (18) and
The value y(t) represents the agent's expected budget for risks over [t, T ] conditioned on the information up to t. This value evolves with the SDE (18) . Note that this interpretation is consistent with the fact that the total budget is initially given by y(0) = r, as specified in the contract. To satisfy the risk-limiting condition or equivalently the expected budget constraint, the budget should not be overspent. Therefore, the terminal value of y must be greater than or equal to zero. We are now ready to prove Theorem 1, i.e., the optimality of the proposed contract.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: In Section III-A, we have already shown that the proposed contract (C * , u * ) is feasible, i.e., it satisfies the agent's individual rationality condition because
Suppose that (C * , u * ) does not solve the original contract design problem (4), i.e., it is not an optimal contract. Select an optimal contract, (Ĉ,û). Then, we have
i.e., (Ĉ,û) is strictly better to the principal than the proposed contract. Letx be driven by the system (6b) with the controlû. Since this new contract satisfies the risk-limiting condition, i.e.,
wherev solves the SDE (6c) withα, and
Using Proposition 1, we confirm that there exist processesβ ∈ A andŷ ∈ L 2 (0, T ) such thatŷ(T ) ≥ 0 a.s., andŷ is driven by (6f) withβ. Therefore, (Ĉ,û,α,β) satisfies all the constraints of the reformulated problem (6) with (x,v,ŷ) except for the constraint (6d) on the initial value ofv.
This contract is strictly better for the principal than (Ĉ,û) becauseC <Ĉ. It also satisfies the agent's individual rationality condition because
This contradicts the fact that (Ĉ,û) is an optimal contract. Therefore, we havev = w, i.e.,v satisfies the initial value constraint (6d). We have just confirmed that (Ĉ,û,α,β) satisfies all the constraints of the reformulated problem (6). Since we design (Ĉ,û) by solving the reformulated problem, the following inequality must hold:
which is contradictory to (19) . Therefore, (C * , u * ) is an optimal contract, i.e., it solves the original contract design problem (4) .
Using the same argument, we can show that any solution to the original contract design problem solves the reformulated problem, and therefore the two problems are equivalent. It is important to recall that the proposed reformulation approach allows us to design a globally optimal contract via dynamic programming. The scalability issue in dynamic programming often limits the practicality of the proposed method to multi-agent problems. To resolve this limitation, in the following subsection we propose an approximate decomposition method for the reformulated problem when a principal simultaneously makes contracts with many agents.
C. Approximately Decoupled Contracts for Multiple Agents and Decentralized Control
Suppose that a principal wants to make contracts with N agents, denoted as (C, u), where C := (C 1 , · · · , C N ) and u := (u 1 , · · · , u N ). Specifically, we consider the following contract design problem:
where (20b) and (20c) specify the dynamics of the shared and unshared systems for agent i, respectively. 8 The ith unshared system can be controlled only by agent i. For simplicity, we assume that each system is one-dimensional. These two systems affect agent i's wealth as follows:
Note that agent i's wealth is not affected by other agents' control actions or unshared systems. On the other hand, the principal's wealth depends on all the system processes and control actions as follows: 
, and the set of admissible control strategies for agent i is given by
progressively measurable with respect to F B i (t)}, where U i is a compact set. In other words, the compensation scheme and the control strategy for agent i must be designed to use the information locally available to agent i. We assume that the principal knows all the agents' systems and wealth functions and can monitor their system states and control actions.
Utilizing the partially decentralized structure of system dynamics, we propose the following decoupled contract design problem for agent i:
In other words, the principal maximizes the utility of the wealth affected by agent i, assuming there are no other agents. Using this approach, we solve N four-dimensional dynamic programs instead of solving the single N + 1 dimensional problem (20) . Furthermore, by using Theorem 2 we can reduce the effective dimension of each decoupled problem by one. Therefore, the proposed approximate contracts for N agents can be obtained by solving N three-dimensional HJB equations. Although this contract is suboptimal for the principal, it satisfies each agent's individual rationality condition, i.e., each agent has an incentive to accept the contract. From the principal's perspective, these decoupled contracts are suboptimal. A suboptimality bound can be computed a posteriori in a decentralized way as follows:
Proposition 3: Let (C * , u * ) and (C,ũ) be the solutions of the original and approximate contract design problems, i.e., (20) and (21), respectively. Then, the following suboptimality bound holds:
Proof:
, where (C i ,ū i ) is given by (22) 
using an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 1. The principal's wealth can be written as
With this linear utility function U p (J p ) ≡ J p , we notice that the auxiliary control variable α does not affect the principal's utility. Similarly, β has no effect on the principal's utility. Therefore, we can set α = β = 0. We can show that (C,ū) with α = β = 0 is a solution to the problem (23) (α, β) ).
On the other hand, using Jensen's inequality, we have
Therefore, the proposed suboptimality bound holds as desired.
Note that the suboptimality bound depends only on (C i ,ũ i ) and (C i ,ū i ) for i = 1, · · · , N, which can be computed in a decentralized way. Specifically, (C i ,ũ i ) and (C i ,ū i ) can be obtained by solving three-dimensional and two-dimensional HJB equations, respectively (see Theorem 2). The controllers u 1 , · · · ,ũ N are decentralized in the sense thatũ i (t) is adapted to F B i (t), i.e., it only requires locally available information. Similarly, the compensation strategyC i uses the information available to agent i. This decoupled structure of the proposed approximate contract is practically important because each contract can be executed and verified (i.e., whether agent i usedũ i or not) in a decentralized way.
V. APPLICATION TO FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT FOR DEMAND RESPONSE
A. Motivation, Setting, and Data
In this section, we apply this paper's contract machinery to the specific setting of retail electricity consumption. The relevant risks we will consider are as follows:
• Relevant customer (agent) risk: In most utility-customer contract settings, load-serving entities (LSEs; commonly simply referred to as utilities) offer customers retail tariffs (prices per kWh) that are set long in advance of the time of consumption. In this setting, customers experience little price risk. 10 However, the quantity they consume is variable, particularly if they have large weather-dependent electric loads, including air conditioners and heat pumps. In this sense customers experience risk (i.e., variability driven by exogenous factors) on the total size of their bill. This risk is exacerbated by behindthe-meter solar photovoltaic systems, which have uncertain output due to variable weather conditions. • Relevant LSE (principal) risk: On the other hand, LSEs must forecast total retail consumer demand and coordinate generators to serve that demand. When LSEs operate in restructured wholesale electricity markets, generator production is coordinated via forward contracts (resulting from both bilateral trades and centralized markets). In this setting, LSEs typically settle demand forecast error at spot market prices. This introduces quantity risk (the demand forecast error) as well as price risk (arising from spot market price volatility). These risks are small in regions where LSEs operate as regulated monopolies that receive a guaranteed rate of return on their capital assets. On the other hand, in regions with competitive retail electricity markets (in the United States this includes Texas and much of the Northeast), LSEs do not receive the same profit guarantees as their monopoly counterparts. The price and quantity risk is most relevant in that competitive setting.
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There is a variety of mechanisms that LSEs and customers can employ to mitigate price and quantity risk, including standard power options [33] , [34] . We focus instead on direct load control to facilitate risk sharing, but we note that our approach is complementary to the application of other financial instruments to mitigate risk. Synthesis of both types of strategies is beyond the scope of this paper. Once an LSE and its customer enter into the contract, the LSE can allocate a portion of the risk to the customer through the compensation scheme and the control strategy for the customer's load specified in the contract. The customer might reasonably worry that such compensation and control could increase the risk of large energy costs and a disruption of comfort. The proposed contract addresses this concern by guaranteeing that the risk in the customer's payoff, a weighted sum of energy costs and discomfort level, is limited by a pre-specified threshold and that the mean of the customer's payoff is greater than another pre-specified level.
Limiting the risk transferred to each customer is also important in real-time pricing (RTP), in which volatile wholesale spot prices are passed through to customers. Although, at least in theory, RTP has been shown to be economically efficient [35] , there is a serious concern that RTP can significantly increase the customers' risks of receiving high energy bills [34] . Our contract can also be combined with RTP to limit each customer's risk, and its performance was validated in [31] . In this section, we consider a situation in which the LSE wants to make a contract with N heterogeneous customers to directly control each customer's personal electric load, such as an air conditioner or a water heater. For simplicity, we assume that each customer allows the LSE control over only one of his or her loads, although the proposed method is also applicable to the case of multiple loads per customer. The LSE's goal is to manage the risk of spending a substantial budget in a real-time electricity market by controlling the customers' loads in the direct load control program. We consider a finite time horizon contract: let [0, T ] be the period in which the contract is effective.
Remark 1:
The perfect information assumption (Assumption 1) is valid in direct load control which we consider. However, this assumption does not hold in the case of indirect load control in which an LSE or an aggregator cannot monitor its customer's load. This alternative case can be handled by an extension of this paper to second-best contracting with asymmetric information [36] .
1) Cumulative Energy Consumption: Let e i (t) ∈ R be the energy consumption (in kWh) up to time t ∈ [0, T ] by customer i and u i (t) ∈ R be the power consumption (in kW) by customer i's electric load in the direct load control program. Note that even when u i (t) = 0, the total power consumption by customer i is not, in general, zero at time t due to the existence of the customer's other loads and possibly solar or wind generation (which can be considered as negative loads). If all the customers enter into the contract, the LSE has the authority to determine u i := {u i (t)} 0≤t≤T for i = 1, · · · , N. The number, N , of customers is typically in the order of 10 3 -10 5 . The uncertainty in the customers' loads and solar and wind power generation causes the energy consumption process e i := {e i (t)} 0≤t≤T to be stochastic. To describe the energy consumption process, we use a stochastic differential equation (SDE) model of the form
where (t)} 0≤t≤T is a onedimensional standard Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω, F, P). The validity of the Brownian motion-based model was tested using the data in [31] in terms of the closed-loop performance of the proposed contact. The functions l i andσ i can be estimated from data on the electric energy consumption of customers in Austin, Texas [37] . The load l i (t) is chosen as the mean value of customer i's power consumption at time t other than the air conditioner. For the estimation ofσ i , we apply the Kalman filter [38] , [39] over the data set for the summer period, from June to September 2013, assuming that customer i's energy consumption profile other than the air conditioner for one day in the period represents one sampled trajectory. We then scale the estimated diffusion coefficient by a constant factor such that
2 dt is equal to the variance of the energy consumption data. This scaling guarantees that Var[J a i [0, 0] ] is equal to the variance of the customer's energy cost.
2) Energy Price in a Real-Time Market:
The energy price in a real-time market is chosen as its locational marginal price (LMP). Let x s (t) be the LMP at time t. The dynamics of the LMP can be modeled as the following SDE [40] , [41] :
where B s := {B s (t)} 0≤t≤T is a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion on (Ω, F, P) and the price volatility σ 0 :
This model is suitable to capture the mean-reverting behavior of energy prices in the real-time (spot) market: when the energy price is high (respectively, low), the supply tends to increase (respectively, decrease), which therefore causes the price to decrease (respectively, increase) [40] . In principle, the LMP is not completely exogenous because it is influenced by the power consumption of the customers' loads. In this work, however, we assume that this effect is negligible and, therefore, that the LMP is exogenous.
We estimate r 0 , ν(t) and σ 0 (t) using the ERCOT LMP data at the settlement point, AUSTIN PLANT, from July 1, 2013, to July 10, 2013 [42] . We apply the Kalman filter on the logarithmically transformed model of (25) . The LMP data is shown in [43, Fig. 2.2] . Jump diffusion models are often useful to capture significant price spikes. Incorporating jumps in prices into our risk sharing model is an important future research problem to enhance the utility of our model. One can also employ an economic dispatch model to take into account the effect of power network congestions on price jumps (e.g., [44] ). Nevertheless the results in the following subsection are valid because our model without jumps well describes the LMP data used in the simulation.
3) Customers' Loads: Consider customer i's load in the direct load control program, and let x us i (t) ∈ R be the system state at time t ∈ [0, T ]. If the load is an air conditioner unit, then x us i (t) would represent the indoor temperature; if the load is a water heater, it would represent the water temperature. Then, the system dynamics can be modeled as the following stochastic differential equation:
for i = 1, · · · , N, where the control u i is a stochastic process. Although our contract method can handle stochastic system models with a diffusion term, we use the model (26) for simplicity.
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Example 1: Let x us i (t) denote the indoor temperature of customer i at time t, and let Θ i (t) represent the corresponding outdoor temperature. Then, the dynamics of the indoor temperature can be described as the following equivalent thermal parameter (ETP) model [45] :
Here, a i = R 1,i /R 2,i , where R 1,i denotes the thermal conductance between the outdoor air and indoor air and R 2,i is the thermal conductance between the indoor air and the thermal mass for customer i's room. The positive constant κ i converts an increase in energy (kWh) to a reduction in temperature ( • C) for customer i's air conditioner. 4) LSE's Wealth Function: The LSE's wealth is chosen as its profit in the direct load control program. Let p(t) ∈ R, 13 Putting the systems (24) , (25) and (26) t ∈ [0, T ], be the amount of power procured by the LSE in the day-ahead market such that
, where p i (t) is the power procured for customer i. We assume that p i , i = 1, · · · , N, is given and choose p i ≡ l i in the numerical experiments in the following subsection.
14 Let C i ∈ R be the compensation paid to customer i in the direct load control program and μ i (t) be the energy price per unit kWh at time t specified in customer i's electricity tariff. The LSE's total profit in real time, i.e., neglecting the cost of power procured in the day-ahead market (which is its revenue obtained from the customers) is then given by
Note that we assume that excess power is sold as easily as deficits are procured. Recall that we use the notation x i := (x s , x us i ). We then define the wealth function of the LSE as
where (28) for i = 1, · · · , N. Here, r i (x i ) represents customer i's comfort level given the system state x i . By using this wealth function, we take into account the customer's comfort as a soft constraint. The superscript a represents the fact that the customer is the agent in the contract. The wealth functions for the LSE and the customers are a little more general than (2) due to the Itô integral terms. We can show that the same exact reformulation approach holds, but the HJB equation needs to be modified. See [43] for more details.
6) Contract Setting: Following Assumption 1, the information availabilities for the LSE and the customers in the direct load control program are symmetric. More specifically, in the proposed framework, the LSE can monitor the control and state of the customers' loads in the direct load control program as well as the energy price in the real-time market. Furthermore, the LSE has all the parameters and functions needed to design an optimal contract. In practice, the load models and comfort functions can be identified using a training period. Each customer can monitor the control and state of his or her load in the direct load control program, his or her energy consumption, and the energy price in the real-time market. Another important feature is that the interactions between the LSE and its customers can be decoupled from each other because one customer's load does not affect those of other customers. This feature allows us to approximately decentralize the control of loads as shown in Section IV-C.
Remark 2: Recall that the decoupled contract can be computed in a completely parallelized way and therefore it is computationally feasible to employ a personalized contract for each agent. One possible implementation scenario is to construct the contract and update the controller for each customer's load through cloud computing [46] .
We assume that the contract period [0, T ] is a time interval within 24 hours, but the proposed method can handle arbitrary finite time horizons. Therefore, the customers and the LSE, in principle, can renew the contracts every day. However, it may not be convenient for each customer to choose a contract every day. This issue can be resolved by automatically choosing to use the contract for the previous day as the contract for the current day unless the customer explicitly wants to change it. Daily contracts have a practical advantage: the day-ahead forecasts of the LMP model parameters and demand uncertainty (and outdoor temperature in the case of air conditioners) can be incorporated into the contracts. Therefore, the contracts can be designed using accurate models. We also assume that customers do not strategically control other loads to modify the forecastedσ i by the LSE. This assumption can be justified in two ways. First, the LSE can make a contract to control multiple loads for a customer so that the customer has little flexibility to changeσ i . Second, even if the customer strategically affectsσ i on one day, the customer's gain on the next day is marginal because the contract is renewed with a new estimateσ i that incorporates any strategic behavior. Formally, this problem can be formulated as a second best contract, in which the LSE chooses the estimates of l i andσ i for the contract period [0, T ] assuming that the customer has no incentive to deviate fromσ i in the contract period. A similar problem is considered in our previous work [47] . This moral hazard problem will be addressed in our future work on indirect load control.
It is worth noting that we consider mean-variance constraints on the customer's payoff given distributional information before uncertainty unfolds. Depending on the purpose of contracting, sample-by-sample or robust constraints could be more appropriate. Extending our constrained risk-sharing model to this case is beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Comparison to Optimal Load Control by Customers
We consider a scenario in which each customer provides one air conditioner for the proposed direct load control program. We use the ETP model (27) for the customer's indoor temperature dynamics given in Example 1. The set of admissible control values is chosen as U i := {0, 2}, assuming that customer i's air conditioner consumes 0 kW in its OFF state and 2 kW in its ON state. The thermal model parameters are chosen as a i = 0.1 and κ i = 1.5, which are calculated based on the residential module user's guide from GridLAB-D and are physically reasonable [48] . Customer i's comfort level function is chosen as (29) in Example 2, with η i = 0.15. We set the customer's desirable indoor temperature range,
We choose the contract period as [10h, 18h].
We use the NOAA Quality Controlled Local Climatological Data in Austin, Texas, for the outdoor temperature profile [49] . The outdoor temperature, Θ i (t), at time t ∈ [10h, 18h] is chosen as the temperature on July 5, 2013, at time t ∈ [10h, 18h] and is shown in [43, Figure 2 .3].
Suppose that customer i does not participate in the direct load control program and has the following wealth function:
where r a i and σ a i are given by (28) . The solution of the following optimal control problem maximizes customer i's expected payoff:
The optimal control can be obtained using the viscosity solution of the following HJB equation [24] :
Letû * i be an optimal control, i.e., a solution to (30) . We let
2 dt be the nominal expected wealth and risk of customer i, respectively. We now compare the performance of the proposed contracts to that of this optimal load control without a contract. We choose the customer's electricity price as the flat price, μ i ≡μ = $0.11, specified in Austin Energy's electricity tariff for summer [50] . In the absence of a contract, the mean and variance of customer i's payoff arew i andr i , respectively. We set w i =w i and r i = γr i and vary γ from 0 to 0.3. If customer i enters into the contract, which is the solution of (21), then the mean value of the customer's payoff is guaranteed to be greater than or equal tow i , and the variance of the customer's payoff is guaranteed to be less than or equal to γr i .
The results of numerical experiments presented in Fig. 2 verify the performance of the proposed contract. The coefficient of LSE's risk aversion is chosen as θ = 10 −2 . As shown in Fig. 2  (a) , the variance of the LSE's payoff decreases as the ratio γ of the amount of the risk that the customer is willing to bear to the customer's nominal risk increases. On the other hand, the variance of the customer's payoff increases as the ratio γ increases, as shown in Fig. 2(b) . More importantly, it is less than or equal to the risk limit r i = γr i . In fact, we see that the optimal control introduces much less risk to consumers than the no-contract case, even when consumers are willing to tolerate more risk. Therefore, we confirm that the risk-limiting condition is satisfied.
When the customer does not enter into in the contract, the variance of the LSE's payoff is By comparing this variance with the variance of the LSE's payoff when the contract is executed (Fig. 2(a) ), we note that the contract reduces the LSE's risk by more than 80% even when the customer is extremely risk-averse, i.e., r i = 0. If the customer chooses r i ≥ 0.2r i in the contract, the LSE's risk is decreased by more than 95%. respectively. Therefore, the LSE can pay $0.027 more for the customer without reducing its mean payoff if the customer enters into a contract. In other words, the LSE can incentivize the customer to enter into the contract by increasing the customer's expected payoff by $0.027.
We also tested the effect of the contract on the control and the indoor temperature. In this set of experiments, we set r i = 0.2r i and θ = 10 −2 . When the customer does not enter into the contract, the customer regularly turns the air conditioner on and off to keep the indoor temperature near 22
• C. (See [43] for more details). This is because the customer wants to save the energy cost by only taking into account the energy price μ i , which is fixed for all time. However, if the customer enters into the contract, the room is cooled before 11 am and from 2 pm to 2:30 pm when the LMP is low and not volatile (Interval I in Fig. 3 ). On the other hand, when the energy price is high and volatile (Interval II in Fig. 3 ), the controller automatically reduces power consumption. In this way, the proposed contractbased control properly manages price risk in the spot market. It is important to note that the controller performs pre-cooling from 3 to 4 pm, right before the period of expensive and volatile prices (Interval III in Fig. 3 ). This automated pre-cooling maintains the indoor temperature in the desired range and therefore guarantees the customer's comfort. The proposed contract is applicable under real-time pricing (RTP), in which real-time wholesale prices are passed through to customers. The effectiveness of the contract to limit the risk transferred to the customer and manage the LSE's risk under RTP can be found in [31] .
VI. CONCLUSION
A new first best continuous-time contract model has been proposed. This model splits a conventional agent's individual rationality condition into two inequality constraints: one for the mean of the agent's wealth and another for its variance. The latter inequality constraint plays a critical role in limiting the risk transferred to the agent through the contract. However, this variance inequality constraint presents a major theoretical challenge in constructing an optimal contract, which is a mean-variance constrained risk-sensitive control problem. We have resolved this difficulty by developing an exact reformulation approach and have solved the reformulated problem by dynamic programming. The key idea is to lift the problem by introducing a new auxiliary stochastic system to track and limit the agent's risks. The utility and effectiveness of the proposed contract method is demonstrated in direct load control for risk management. The proposed risk-limiting approach can also be used in the second best case (moral hazard) by defining the agent's incentive compatibility using the Pareto efficient frontier associated with the mean and variance of the agent's wealth.
